

in effect there have been no previous reported violations of the convention by Japanese vessels taking salmon or halibut on our side, that is, east of the abstinence line. This record was not only broken by reports over the weekend, but was dramatically and massively smashed with a series of reports involving a total of 19 Japanese fishing vessel sightings during the past several days in violation of Japanese treaty obligations. The sightings were made by Coast Guard and Navy patrol planes. The vessels were sighted illegally fishing up to 90 miles across the abstinence line. One vessel was seized by the U.S. Coast Guard and later attempted to leave the scene of violations. This vessel at last report was being escorted to Adak, Alaska, for return to appropriate Japanese authorities under the terms of the international convention.

All the facts and details on this serious and unfortunate occurrence are not in. I believe, however, that when the full story is known, there will be revealed a sad chapter in the history of Japanese-American relations in the fisheries field. For many years we have diligently attempted to make international arrangements by which our interest and Japan's interest would be fully protected. Many of us hoped that this was accomplished by joining with Japan and Canada in negotiating and finally ratifying the North Pacific Fisheries Convention in 1953. However, our experience under the convention has left much to be desired. During these years Japan has, for the first time in history, taken substantial quantities of salmon of North American origin, principally the red salmon which spawn in rivers feeding into Bristol Bay. This activity has continued, although it is a clear violation of the intent and purpose of the convention.

The provisional abstinence line was set at 175° west longitude as a temporary line marking that area in which no salmon of North American origin migrated. In recent years American scientists and Japanese scientists have agreed that Bristol Bay salmon do migrate beyond the provisional line, yet Japan has steadfastly refused to agree to adjust the location of the line. As a result Japan has taken large quantities of North American salmon and has taken them on the high seas in a manner that makes the conservation of salmon by the State of Alaska virtually impossible. American fishermen are not permitted to fish with nets on the high seas because of the waste involved in taking immature fish, the damage to the fish caught or lost, and the inability to determine any proper escapement of salmon for individual spawning streams.

Japan's catch of salmon on the high seas has been severely, and in my opinion very properly, criticized by all who are familiar with the problem. This past week Japan openly, and flagrantly, and grossly violated her own international commitments by permitting large mother ships to operate close to the abstinence line and thereby encouraging large numbers of Japanese catcher vessels to engage in the salmon fishery on our side of the line. Only a very severe and direct

reproach will be adequate to express the feelings of our fishermen and others interested in the conservation of this important fishery resource. In my opinion, we will for many generations look back on this dark episode and wonder if Japan can be expected to comply with any future international commitments on the conservation of fishery resources on the high seas.

#### BIG BROTHER: ANTIBUG

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, recently, considerable attention has been given to a new device, labeled "Antibug," an electronic jamming instrument.

I have some most interesting correspondence from the manufacturer of Antibug, indicating that electronic snooping, far from being an American phenomenon, is an international problem of very large proportions.

The manufacturer also enclosed a sheet of details for antisnooping which is most interesting.

I ask unanimous consent to have this material printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DECTRON INDUSTRIES, INC.,  
May 20, 1965.

Mr. BERNARD FENSTERWALD, Jr.,  
Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. FENSTERWALD: With reference to your letter dated May 3, 1965 concerning Newsweek, April 26, 1965, coverage of our new product line, "Antibug," this office is very interested in cooperating with your committee. I enclose literature covering our Antibug model Mark I. I enclose also, for your convenience, copies of sources of supply for "bugging equipment" as well as other information and background material.

In addition to Antibug model Mark I, Antibug models III and IV have been designed and developed upon the demand of national heads of industry, Government officials and business leaders. Models Mark III and Mark IV are smartly tailored desk equipment which will protect an entire building area or in some cases a complete building. Using the Mark I or II together with Mark III or IV businessmen are assured of the opportunity to talk openly and freely within the offices or conference rooms, and the personalized portable models, Mark I and II extend this coverage during outside discussions.

Public response to the recent introduction of "Antibug," Mark I, by several international magazine articles featuring "bugging," newspapers, worldwide television, together with Dectron's own research program has definitely shown that people throughout the world, at all levels, are keenly aware of this common security problem. For your personal interest, Mr. Hugh W. Jamieson, one of the original partners of Litton Industries, Beverly Hills, Calif., is currently chairman of the board of directors in this firm. Mr. Jamieson has been involved in a \$28 million law suit, the decision of which is still pending, and much of the background of this case involves "bugging and listening devices." Mr. Jamieson's problem with this private invasion was one of the pertinent inspirations for the application of Dectron R. & D. discoveries into the creation of the "Antibug." I understand from several prominent magazine and newspaper sources requesting assistance from this firm, that feature articles of international scope will be

forthcoming on this subject, and that continued worldwide publicity regarding this issue of bugging may be anticipated.

As you are probably aware, the Newsweek article referred to above, was read into the recent FDA testimony before the Judiciary Committee. I shall be delighted to assist you and your future endeavors with required information or other requests.

Thank you most kindly for your interest in this firm and our product line.

Sincerely yours,

E. S. MOORHEAD,  
Director of Marketing and Research.

#### DECTRON INDUSTRIES, INC.

If you don't like snoopers around your house or office, here's what you can do:

1. Rent or borrow a small mine detector. These are readily available from supply houses that serve the building industry. They are also used by experts who call themselves "anti-intrusion specialists." A mine detector will change the pitch of its sound when passed near a wired mine.

2. Buy a small used neon sign and turn it on near your phone when you talk. A snooper will hear nothing but the loud buzzing radiated by the sign's transformer. This works only with an induction coil, not with a wired tap.

3. To detect a wireless mike, you can use a special FM set tuned to 74 megacycles. A squeal is your tipoff. Leave the set on to jam the FM channel.

4. Talk quietly and turn on a nearby radio set—fairly loud, to balk wireless mikes. Today's snooper devices can eliminate certain interfering tones, but these tricks still work. So does the business of letting water run in a shower.

5. Call the phone company if you see a suspicious man working on a pole or near your wires. If a repairman comes to your door, check with the phone company before admitting him. (Credentials are easily faked.)

6. Check with the phone company if you hear your phone ring and a voice say, "just checking."

7. Notify your phone company, the FBI, the FCC, or any other law enforcement agencies if you hear persistent "funny sounds." These sometimes occur in stormy weather, but shouldn't persist. A good telephone line is silent. Strange scratchings, an echo, or odd delays are a tipoff of a tap.

So are faint voices. These used to be caused by induction from other wires. But today's lines are better. Such sounds are sometimes caused by an imbalance in the circuit, due to unskilled wiretapping.

8. If you're a top-secret man, you can buy a portable telephone conversation scrambler for about \$275 a set. It's held against the phone and changes your voice into unintelligible sounds that can only be unscrambled by a matching device.

#### THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, one of the men best qualified to speak on American relations with Latin America is Dr. John Plank, a former foreign service officer and professor of Latin American affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Dr. Plank is now a member of the staff of the highly regarded Brookings Institution. He is one of our most astute and knowledgeable experts on Latin American affairs.

Writing in the June 6 issue of the New York Times magazine, Dr. Plank asserts:

Honest dialog between the two Americas and true inter-American cooperation,

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never frequent or easy, have been made much more difficult by our Dominican intervention.

Dr. Plank sees the U.S. intervention in the Dominican struggle as an unfortunate result of "an overemphasis on cold war criteria." He warns that "the ferment of change in Latin America today should not be evaluated in cold war terms." As he puts it:

If, for instance, the Alliance for Progress comes widely to be believed in Latin America to be nothing more than a weapon in our cold war arsenal, the Alliance for Progress will die.

Mr. President, I believe that President Johnson is striving mightily to correct what may very well have been a mistaken unilateral intervention on our part in the Dominican crisis. To avoid further questionable actions of this kind, I do hope that our policy planners will ponder carefully the article by Dr. Plank which I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**OUR GOOD NEIGHBORS SHOULD COME FIRST**  
(By John Plank)

We cannot yet reckon fully the costs to us of sudden, unilateral military intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. We are obliged, however, on the basis of what we do know to look again at the Latin American policy of the United States. What are its principles, its premises and assumptions, its goals and priorities?

Such questions need urgently to be considered. Our Government's Dominican actions have caused concern among responsible citizens throughout the hemisphere, many of whom think they see in those actions signs of a partial return to a policy believed to have been superseded years ago. That policy was characterized by a thinly veiled contempt for the Latin Americans, self-arrogation to the United States of responsibility for determining the hemisphere's destinies, and a too-ready disposition to rely on our Armed Forces in defense of our hemispheric interests. A cloud of suspicion and doubt, confusion and bewilderment, now hangs over the region. Honest dialog between the two Americas and true inter-American cooperation, never frequent or easy, have been made much more difficult by our Dominican intervention.

The possibility of a tragic miscalculation of the Dominican kind—a miscalculation evidently traceable to faulty reporting from our embassy personnel and others in Santo Domingo—has been a real and present danger for more than a decade, ever since the onset of the cold war in Latin America.

Since the 1950's our Latin American policy has been marked by an awkward if unavoidable dualism. One strand of policy has run from the era of the "good neighbor" and the traditions, myths, customs and institutions of the Inter-American system. To the extent that this strand has informed policy decisions, the states of Latin America have been regarded as standing in a special familial relation to us. They, while weaker than we and much less successful, are entitled to our full respect. Their integrity, independence, and sovereign equality with us are, at almost all costs, to be safeguarded, not only against threats and incursions from outside the hemisphere but also against untoward manifestations of our own vast power. Every appropriate effort is to be made to help our Latin American neighbors translate their juridical equality with us into effective equality in respects—political, economic, and social.

The other strand of policy, which is not really compatible with the former one, derives from our conception of Latin America as an active theater in the cold war, one of the battlegrounds on which we engage those whom we have identified as our mortal enemies, the Communists. In Latin America, as in Asia, Africa, and Europe, our national survival is seen ultimately to be at stake.

Those in our Government who are charged with responsibility for our Latin American policy find themselves in an extraordinarily difficult situation. In effect, they are required to approach Latin America with split vision, and the Latin America that appears under the good-neighbor perspective is not the Latin America that appears under the cold-war perspective.

The consequences of this duality of approach are manifested in all aspects of our official dealings with Latin America: political, military, economic, social, even cultural. No decision respecting Latin America is taken without some weighing of good-neighbor considerations against cold-war ones. Because of the different natures of the policy criteria, ambiguity in our Latin American policy decisions is inevitable.

Is a leading Latin American intellectual to be invited to the United States and encouraged to meet with North Americans, or is he to be denied a visa because of his failure to pass a stringent political test administered by a cautious consular officer? Is military assistance to a despotic regime to be curtailed because it is known that the regime maintains itself in power only through the use or threat of force; or is such assistance to be continued because the despot and his armed henchmen have been ferocious, if frequently overzealous and unsophisticated, battlers against the Communists? Is economic aid to be given to a country because of the country's desire to develop and our recognition of the crying needs of its people; or is it to be withheld because of doubts about the depths of commitment of the country's political leaders to our side in the cold war?

Although both kinds of criteria continue to be employed, it seems evident that during recent times cold-war considerations have weighed ever more heavily in the scales of judgment. That this should be the case is understandable. The cold war completely overshadows all other concerns in our global foreign policy. Moreover, the cold war in this hemisphere is becoming more intense and has, since 1959 and Castro's appearance, taken on increasingly a paramilitary cast.

Also, it is not surprising that our overworked officials, burdened with heavy responsibilities and harried by the press and Congress, should want to simplify their decisionmaking process by greater and greater subordination of good-neighbor factors to cold-war ones. They can accomplish this subordination by assuming that good-neighbor policy and cold-war policy are strictly congruent. As time passes they will come to believe that. Some of them undoubtedly already do so.

We shall pay much for such subordination, however, and we should consider carefully whether it is worth its cost. Our Dominican disaster, for example, and its unfortunate hemispheric repercussions, are largely accountable to an overemphasis on cold-war criteria, almost to the exclusion of criteria of other sorts. If our interest in a given country is focused heavily on the question of Communist capabilities and prospects, if a disproportionate number of questions put by Washington to our missions in the field, whether bearing on matters political, economic, social, or military, are to be answered with the Communist/non-Communist dichotomy at the forefront of attention, then our understanding of that country is going to be seriously biased. The ferment of

change in Latin America today should not be evaluated in cold-war terms.

There is another, more serious consequence of weighting cold-war factors too heavily in devising Latin American policy. It is that we shall alienate increasing numbers of Latin Americans and shall forfeit much of our small capital of trust and confidence so painfully and haltingly acquired during the past 30 years.

If, for instance, the Alliance for Progress comes widely to be believed in Latin America to be nothing more than a weapon in our cold-war arsenal, the Alliance for Progress will die. The formal machinery of the Alliance will persist, of course, but the business transacted under its aegis will be disguised blackmail operations on the Latin American side and disguised bribery or pay-off on our own. The spirit, the mystique, the challenge of the Alliance will disappear—and with them our best hope for building an effective Inter-American community.

What must be stressed is that the Latin Americans think of themselves as people, not as objects at stake in a global conflict. They think of their states as societies in search of individual national identities and destinies, not as pieces of inhabited territory to be allocated to one side or the other in the cold war. Under the good-neighbor perspective, these aspects of the Latin American reality are recognized; under the cold-war perspective they are not, except derivatively and expedientially.

We must not allow the cold war to elide or absorb the good neighbor. The latter antedates the former and, is a more comprehensive and profound expression of our best long-range interests. In striking the balance between the demands imposed by the one and those imposed by the other, knowledge counts for more than doctrine, understanding for more than fervor, judgment for more than determination, and prudence for more than might.

It is tempting to speculate on how different might have been the course of our relations with Latin America had we chosen in 1945 to announce our willingness to give positive content to the good-neighbor policy through a program analogous to the Alliance for Progress. Had we done so, and had we moved with energy and good will to implement the program, the impact of the cold war upon the hemisphere and upon our Latin American policy would have been very different. For we should have initiated our program at a time of exceptional inter-American harmony and we might well have captured the momentum of Inter-American cooperation acquired during the Second World War.

Moreover, we would have had a crucial margin of time, several years, in which to help Latin America prepare itself for the revolution of expectations and to establish firmly our identification with the forces of constructive, responsible, democratic reform.

This speculation is useful only because it serves to point up how very different was the policy we actually followed, which was until recently one of comparative neglect of the region. Although alert to the more obvious cold-war threats in the hemisphere (we moved expeditiously to prevent a Communist takeover of Guatemala in 1954), and although not unsympathetic to the restless strivings of most people in the area for fundamental changes in their own status and in the traditionally sanctioned order of their societies, we devoted little time and few resources to Latin America.

On the basis of periodic reassurances to ourselves that there existed in the region "an immense reservoir of good will" toward the United States we relegated Latin America to the lowest priority among the major areas of the world. Busy confronting the Communists elsewhere, busy building new alliances

and bolstering old ones, we regarded Latin America as something of a nuisance. What we wanted in the hemisphere above all else was quiet. We did not want our attention diverted from our other more important tasks.

The decade 1948-58 was a crucial one for Latin America. The region's great masses, urban and rural, bestirred themselves and began to make demands—political, economic, and social—that they had not made earlier and that the established order simply could not meet. The intellectuals, the professionals, the students, toyed with alternative modes of political and social organization. Nationalism, often strident and xenophobic, came increasingly to serve the purposes of Latin American demagogues.

Democratic regimes were sorely tried; the more fragile of them collapsed into dictatorships. The possibility of mass violence became ever more real. It is symbolic that the decade began in the year of the devastating Bogotá riots and ended in the year that Vice President Nixon was attacked in Lima and Caracas. Fidel Castro is reported to have been in Bogotá in 1948; we know where he was in 1958.

Where was the United States? Was it energetically, wholeheartedly, and constructively helping the Latin Americans to solve their economic and social problems? Was it identified in the minds of Latin America's young people with the forces of responsible but major change? Did the United States, through its actions in that decade, give those young people reason automatically to cast their lot with it in the global struggle against communism? The questions are rhetorical.

Young people do not stay young; a person 20 years old in 1948 was 30 in 1958; he is 37 today. The United States, through negligence rather than design, nearly forfeited a generation of Latin Americans.

That it did not altogether forfeit them is due to the tardy recognition by the Eisenhower administration that the immense reservoir of good will was rapidly drying up. More important, it is due to the sensitivity and vision of President Kennedy, who captured the imagination of Latin Americans as no other U.S. President except Lincoln has done and who, through his announcement of the Alliance for Progress, put the United States squarely on the side of profound reform in Latin America.

President Kennedy's Latin American policy combined as deftly as two such incongruent elements can be combined, the good neighbor and the cold war. Both weighed heavily in all his Latin American decisions. Some among us criticize him for the inconclusiveness of his actions against Castro, but the President was not to be pushed into behavior that would jeopardize, perhaps destroy, the developing climate of inter-American trust and cooperation. When the introduction of missiles directly threatened our vital national interests, he moved forcefully, but that threat absent, he acted with masterful restraint.

Some Latin Americans criticized him for making assistance under the Alliance for Progress contingent upon the carrying out of difficult reforms; but the President, relating the Alliance for Progress to the cold war, judged that only by undergoing profound and painful changes could the societies of Latin America acquire the inner coherence, the national consensus, that would make possible their withstanding, over the long term, Communist subversion and aggression.

There was, of course, a personal dimension of President Kennedy's Latin American behavior that transcended policy matters as such, one that must be taken into account in assessing his performance. He conveyed to the Latin Americans, as his predecessors had not done, that he understood and sym-

pathized with them, that their problems were his problems. Responsible democratic and reformist Latin Americans felt that in President Kennedy they had a champion.

President Johnson inherited President Kennedy's Latin American problems and program. What he did not and could not inherit was the special trust and confidence invested in President Kennedy by the Latin Americans. That trust and confidence President Johnson will have to earn himself.

It must be said that he has not yet earned it, and that this Government's reaction to the outbreak of major disorders in the Dominican Republic has done little to reassure those to the south.

Today Latin America is in crisis. Only in Mexico and Chile, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, is there real institutional stability, and the future of at least two of those countries is perhaps less certain than present appearances would indicate.

The causes of the crisis are well known: the revolution of expectations, expanding populations pressing on limited resources; immense population shifts from rural squalor to urban poverty and congestion; invidious class distinctions; serious unemployment, and worrisome inflation; inequitable patterns of tax and income distribution; unresponsive and ineffective governments; lack of skilled and responsible political leadership and of adequate institutions for effective popular political participation.

This list is far from exhaustive. But are there not enough items on it to account for massive unrest in Latin America? The turbulence we have seen in the region in the past is likely to pale before the turbulence we shall see during the months and years ahead.

In the absence of out-and-out occupation by our Armed Forces, we cannot exert other than marginal and indirect control over developments in the states of Latin America. With that in mind, what should our policy be as we confront the troubled situation below our borders? In the eyes of the world we are at a clear policy crossroads today, and the world is awaiting our next major decision to see which route we have chosen. The options available to us can be reduced to two.

First, we can conclude, as evidently we did in taking our Dominican actions, that the cold war risks in this hemisphere have become so great, the capability of Communist elements to take advantage of situations so advanced, and the inability of other Latin American elements to deal with the internal problems of their societies so manifest, that the United States must reexamine its whole relationship to the inter-American system and to the good-neighbor policy that system reflects.

More specifically, we can conclude that the United States must take to itself the right not only unilaterally to determine the existence and nature of Communist threats of takeover of Latin American societies, but also to act unilaterally or preemptively if in our judgment such action is called for to repel those threats. The principles of self-determination, nonintervention and multilateral decisionmaking regrettably may have to take second place from time to time to the exigencies of the cold war. Those principles, of course, will remain operative, but only within limits established by ourselves.

The second option depends upon a sharply different assessment. By this assessment, the conflict between progressive and traditional interests is the dominant problem in Latin America today, and our cold war engagement with the Communists in the hemisphere is refracted through this prism in the eyes of most politically engaged Latin Americans. They do not, and they will not, see the cold war as we do. Most Latin American societies are in the incipient stages of profound na-

tional transformation with attendant disorder and the likelihood of violence (after all, the mold of custom is being broken). But very few Latin Americans participating in the social and political processes now underway foresee—or want to foresee—at the end of their national revolutions a substitution of their former relationship with the United States by a suffocating identification with the Communist world.

What they want is independence, identity, integrity, national dignity, things of which they feel their histories have until now deprived them. What they want is to move into the modern world, but to do so on their own, not on the leading strings of either the United States or the Communist powers. They want to be free to make their own mistakes, to decide their own destinies. They do not want to be Communists nor to see their societies taken over by the Communists; but they take it ill that the United States should presume to tell them what they can and cannot want.

The policy course that one derives from this assessment calls for sensitive understanding of the aspirations that motivate most demands for change in today's Latin America. It calls for a recognition that to equate anti-Americanism with procommunism is much too simple, and that much activity that we regard as being undertaken against our interest is not sparked by the Communists nor being carried out for the purpose of moving the region into the Communist camp.

It also calls for the utmost restraint and the most scrupulous caution on our part in the use of our coercive power. It calls for a show of confidence in the Latin Americans, a willingness to stand in the background and to let them largely on their own complete their perilous passage to modernity. It calls for a substantial elevation in the status assigned to good-neighbor considerations in the formulation of our decisions, a further development of the Latin American policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, and the evaluation of cold-war threats under the assumptions of good-neighbor premises rather than the reverse.

The risks involved in this second policy are real. We cannot forget our bitter Cuban experience. But we do the Latin Americans small credit by assuming that the lessons of Cuba have been altogether lost upon them. Moreover, we must weigh these risks against the certain consequences of following the first policy. Those consequences include the evisceration of the inter-American system, a sharp reversal in our progress toward inter-American community, the welling up of great resentment toward the United States on the part of most Latin Americans, and a corresponding increase in the appeal of Communist propaganda and agitation.

Further, if we follow this policy, we shall probably have to set up proxy or client regimes in troubled parts of the hemisphere more and more frequently, in violation of legitimate nationalist aspirations, and to commit our own Armed Forces, with the deplorable effects such commitment entails. Neither our own long-term interests nor those of the Latin Americans will be well served if we follow this course.

On the other hand, if we reassign primacy to the philosophy of the good neighbor in our hemispheric dealings, we shall probably see intensified and evermore fruitful efforts by responsible Latin American leaders to work together and with us, across national frontiers, to resolve pressing Latin American problems. Knowing that we will protect them against external threats and will help them upon request to cope with domestic violence and subversion, they will move with greater assurance and optimism to meet the demands of their societies. Knowing that our attitude toward them is benign and constructive, they will assert their independence



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from us in various ways, experimenting with their freedom. They will increasingly act without us; they will not be acting against us. Over the longer term they will surmount their ingrained fear of us, their nagging sense of inferiority in dealing with us, and will assume their proper roles as self-confident, responsible members of a hemispheric community of which we too will be a part. Surely that is the outcome we want to see. Surely the running of some short-term risks is not too high a price to pay for its attainment.

#### DEMONSTRATIONS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Mr. MONTTOYA. Mr. President, during the past several months, we have read articles in the press concerning demonstrations on college campuses across the Nation in opposition to the President's policy in Vietnam as well as teach-ins on the part of the intellectual community.

A refreshing change is the responsible action taken by the student council of the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, in adopting a resolution in support of the administration's actions. I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the foreign policy of the United States is of vital concern to the students of the University of New Mexico; and

Whereas the present situation in Vietnam is of great significance to the students of the University of New Mexico as members of the world community: Be it

*Resolved by the Student Council of the University of New Mexico, That the student council of the University of New Mexico pledges its support to the actions being taken by President Johnson in Vietnam.*

JIM BRANCH, Jr.,  
Student Body President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### WE CANNOT WIN COLD WARS WITHOUT REALLY TRYING

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in early March I began a series of statements to the Senate to demonstrate from the periodical press the need for establishment of an institution similar to the proposed Freedom Academy, a new agency in the American Government to conduct intensive research in the art of unconventional or nonmilitary warfare and to provide extensive related training to three broad categories of persons. One category of trainees would be American Government personnel whose work concerns international relations. The second category would be citizens of foreign countries who need training for defense

to help protect their own countries' national sovereignties against this new and highly successful type of aggression. American citizens employed abroad outside the Government would compose the third category. These are persons who could contribute considerably to the stability of host societies if properly trained and if properly utilized.

Each house of Congress has had before it more than 5 years bills which propose similar action. In 1960 the Senate approved such a bill, accepting the favorable report of the Committee on the Judiciary, ordered printed on June 30, 1960, which observed in part:

The committee considers this bill to be one of the most important ever introduced in the Congress. This is the first measure to recognize that a concentrated development and training program must precede a significant improvement in our cold war capabilities. The various agencies and bureaus can be shuffled and reshuffled. Advisory committees, interdepartmental committees, and coordinating agencies can be created and recreated, but until they are staffed by highly motivated personnel who have been systematically and intensively trained in the vast and complex field of total political warfare, we can expect little improvement in our situation.

The one lone Freedom Academy \* \* \* can lay the foundation for a major breakthrough. Properly staffed and funded, it will stand as a symbol of our determination to win the cold war. It will give courage to our friends and dismay our enemies. It is a practical, fundamental approach to our national survival. The committee recommends the enactment of the Freedom Commission bill at the earliest possible time.

But the House of Representatives failed to act in 1960. The bill, although subsequently introduced and subjected to several hearings, has not been moved since.

Five years ago the Vietnamese war was just beginning. We were just recognizing the Cuban revolution as Communists. We have allowed 5 valuable years of time to elapse without significant effort to improve defense of the non-Communist world against nonmilitary aggression.

On March 4—page 4059 of the RECORD—I discussed my intentions for this series of statements to the Senate.

To the many observers who support the Freedom Academy concept, this attitude that we are not so successful as we might be has required no argumentative support; and, naively perhaps, we have thought we needed no considerable evidential support in contending that our side of the world is not prepared to fight in the specific arena where the battle between Communist aggressors and their victims is being fought.

This is the area of nonmilitary or guerrilla warfare. I noted our past experience in guerrilla warfare, citing the increasing sophistication characterizing these tactics since we ourselves have adopted more conventional techniques.

Its political side is far more thorough now. Psychological warfare is mounted against a people by their enemies from within to soften their resistance to the more tangible guerrilla or quasi-military operation conducted in conjunction with it at the later stages of attack.

And we seem to stand by, wringing our hands, wondering what is going on as we see the will to resist among an ally's people wafting away like so much smoke.

On March 11—pages 4751-4753 of the RECORD—I utilized newspaper dispatches to demonstrate the use of such methods by Communist aggressors to take control of the Congo Republic.

Then on March 18—pages 5276-5280 of the RECORD—I discussed the critical deficiency in the non-Communist world in simple understanding of the techniques of nonmilitary warfare. The subject has been intensely studied by Communist leaders for more than a generation. They have developed a new academic discipline about which we know remarkably little.

On April 1—pages 6282-6387—my topic, along with further current demonstrative news dispatches, was an evaluation by Hanson Baldwin of overall U.S. strategy in the present international climate.

On April 13—pages 7599-7603 of the RECORD—my subject was a series of Communist takeovers and near takeovers in Africa.

The subject on April 28—pages 8508-8515 of the RECORD—was the threatening development of aggressive campaigns in Latin America.

And, most recently, on May 14—10172-10179 of the RECORD—I reviewed the development of the Freedom Academy proposal and tried further to demonstrate the validity of the idea to the present context of Latin American developments.

The bill, S. 1231, is sponsored by a diverse group of Senators. They are a bipartisan group, and their philosophical views range widely from liberal to conservative. But they agree on this proposal as a promising means to bolster our defenses and our allies' defenses against a new kind of aggressive warfare for which we have not sufficiently prepared ourselves. Besides myself, sponsors of the bill are Senators CASE, DODD, DOUGLAS, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, LAUSCHE, MILLER, PROUTY, PROXMIER, SCOTT, SMATHERS, MURPHY, and FANNIN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 6 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 6 minutes.

Mr. MUNDT. Today I should like to discuss one of the areas of incipient development of a new nonmilitary aggressive campaign. In this campaign, targeted at Thailand, we have actually been formally notified by the aggressor, Communist China, that their campaign is begun. This seems to be the declaration of war in this new kind of aggressive warfare.

The Washington Post of January 31, 1965, printed a dispatch by Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News Service in which appeared one of the earliest accounts of the declaration of war against Thailand. Beech filed his story from Bangkok: